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The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to
Cure the Organ Deficit
DAVID E. JEFFERIES"
I. INTRODUCTION
"Burke and Hare were so stimulated by the easy money that they decided to
make more by creating their own corpses."'
Debate has long swirled around the question of what rights, if any, persons
have to dispose of their bodies and body parts. The recognition or creation of
such rights could lead to ethical dilemmas. For example, if disposal rights are
created or recognized, bodies and their parts may become commercialized,
thereby resulting in human rights violations. A gross manifestation of this
problem arose in early nineteenth-century England. There the use of cadavers
for teaching anatomy in medical schools led to the infamous "body-snatching"
scandals to supply the trade with human corpses.' The market created resulted
not only in the theft of dead bodies, but also served as a catalyst for murders;
the infamous William Burke, who lived in a lodging house in Edinburgh,
murdered sixteen of his guests over a period of one year and sold their bodies
to the local medical school.'
In response to these scandals, the English legislature enacted the Anatomy
Act of 1832, which provided for the "licensing of both instructors and students
of anatomy, supervision by government inspectors, and the filing of regular
reports."4 The Act also created criminal liability for "body-snatching."5 This
brief exercise in a free market resulted in unfortunate consequences and should
now serve as a cautionary reminder of the dangers of allowing a market in the
constituent organs of the human body to operate unabated.
* J.D., 1998, Indiana University School ofLaw, Bloomington; M.S., Biotechnology, 1993,Northwestem
University; B.A., Biology, 1992, Earlham College. The author would like to thank his parents, Robert and
Sylvia Jefferies, for their support throughout school.
1. RUSSELL ScoTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 9 (1981).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at9.
4. Id. at 11.
5. Id. See also Jason Altman, Organ Transplantations: The Needfor an International Open Organ
Market, 5 TouRo Ir'L L. REV. 161,162 (1994).
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. To date, it appears that the warning has been heeded. Only a few countries,
principally India and certain South American nations, have a system of organ
procurement for nonregenerative organs that operates on free market principles.6
Although "body snatching" scandals are no longer prevalent, the value of the
human body nevertheless creates the danger of the development of black
markets. With the advent of successful organ transplant techniques, the greatest
value in the human body now inheres in its component parts.7 To what lengths
might a desperately ill person be willing to go to obtain a body part that might
dramatically improve the quality of such person's life or even literally save it?
After all, the benefits from transplants flow to the patient, the family of the
donor, and society alike. Medicine has developed the ability to save and
improve the quality of life for organ recipients. At the same time, the altruistic
nature of the operation may help the surviving family cope with their feelings
of grief and loss.
In current transplantation practice, an ever-widening gap exists between the
number of organs needed for transplantations and the number of organs
donated.' Various systems have been proposed to increase the supply oforgans
and solve this shortage. All systems implemented thus far have a common
element: they have all failed. In response, commentators have suggested that
creating an open market in organs would solve the supply problem. This
proposal has met a heated reaction on many levels. Admittedly, market systems
bring the benefit of increased supply through financial incentives. However,
this is only half of the equation. If a market system were to be used, safeguards
would be needed to avoid the pitfalls which befell England when it allowed trade
in corpses.
Part II of this note briefly examines the history of organ transplantation and
the increasing shortage of organs. Part III examines the history and the current
legal status of the organ donation system in the United States. Part IV
6. H. Kieis, Worldwide Organ Trafficking: Fact or Fiction?, in ORGAN ANDTISsUE TRANSPLANTAT1ON
IN TE EUROPEAN UNION: MANAGEMEToDFFFDiCULTES AND HEALTHRisKS LINKEDTO DONORS 67, 70(Yvon
Englert ed., 1995). Regenerative organs are those that the body can replace, such as blood, sperm, ovum, cells,
and hair. Nonregenerative organs are those that cannot replaced, such as the heart, lungs, liver, pancreas, and
kidneys. Gloria J. Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable
Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45,47 (1995).
7. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 3.
8. See Mark F. Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation: From Where Will New Donors
Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATX 249,253 (1995); Maria Clark, Solving the Kidney
Shortage Crisis Through the Use of Non-Heart-Beating Cadaveric Donors: Legal Endorsement. of
Perfusion as a Standard Procedure, 70 IND. L.J. 929, 930-32 (1995); Melissa N. Kurnit, Organ Donation in
the United States: Can We Learn From Successes Abroad?, 17 B.C. INT'L& COMp. L. REv. 405,427 (1994).
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compares and contrasts organ procurement systems of other countries and
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each system. Particular attention
is given to the countries of the European Union as well as the Chinese system
with its flagrant human rights violations. Part V proposes a system of market
incentives to encourage people to donate their organs. This proposed system
should expand the pool of donors, thereby increasing the supply of available
organs. To avoid the pitfalls arising from bartering for organs, this proposal
advocates a limited market where individuals will be allowed to enter into
contracts to sell their organs only to licensed organ "warehouses." This system
will prevent the exploitation of the poor to provide organs for the wealthy. The
"warehouses" will use altruistic criteria to decide who receives the organs
purchased by these organizations. Overtime, the need for criteria will abate as
the shortage of organs is reduced and eventually eliminated.
II. A HISTORY OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND THE ORGAN SHORTAGE
A. Transplantation History
The first kidney transplant, using a cadaver, was performed in the Soviet
Union in 1936; by 1954, doctors in the United States had accomplished this feat
using a living donor.9 In the ensuing decades, advances in organ transplantation
techniques evolved with increasing rapidity. The first successful heart
transplant was performed in South Africa in 1967 and the first larynx transplant
in Belgium in 1969."0
Medical science made improvements not only in the types of organs that
could be transplanted, but in the survival rates of the patients as well. Although
the first recipient of a heart transplant lived only eighteen days, by 1992, eighty-
five percent of heart transplant recipients survived at least one year. ' Much of
this improvement in survival rates can be attributed to the discovery of various
immunosuppressive drugs-most notably cyclosporin, introduced in
9. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 407. See also Scorr, supra note 1, at 20.
10. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 407.
11. Id
1998]
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1983-which allowed doctors to control the body's rejection of donated
organs.2
The period of time over which a harvested organ's viability may be
maintained before its transplant into the recipient body has also been increased,
thereby allowing for a greater geographical range in which to match donors and
donees. 3 As a result, the number of potential organ transplant recipients has
been greatly increased. Unfortunately, the number of organs donated has failed
to keep pace.
B. The Organ Shortage
Annually, 300,000 people receive organ transplants worldwide. 4 Not
everyone who needs a transplant receives one, and there remains a surplus of
patients waiting to receive an organ. Every year this number increases. At the
close of 1994, 37,684 patients languished in hospitals and homes, their names
still on waiting lists. 5 By May 4, 1995, that number had risen to 39,845; a
figure that has grown as long as there have been records.' 6 However, these
numbers do not tell the complete story. Physicians, knowing that organ supplies
are limited, have kept the waiting lists artificially low by referring only the best
candidates for transplant. 7 There may be as many as 15,000 persons who need
heart transplants, 22,500 who need kidney transplants, 5,000 who need liver
transplants, and 5,000 who need pancreas transplants." The supply falls far
short of the need since approximately 4,500 cadaveric donors are obtained each
year.'9 This short fall continues to grow as survival rates cause the organ
demand to increase while the pool of voluntary donors remains static. 0
The needless death of those on waiting lists is not the only problem
attributable to the organ deficit. Another problem is the existence of a black
market. Physicians must choose between patients when allocating
12. Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft
Act, 68 B.U. L. Rav. 681,682 (1988).
13. Kumit, supra note 8, at 408.
14. Christian Williams, Combatting the Problems of Human Rights Abuses and Inadequate Organ
Supply Through Presumed Donative Consent, 26 CASE W. REs. J. INr'L L. 315,318 (1994).
15. Clark, supra note 8, at 930-3 1.
16. Anderson, supra note 8, at 253.
17. Id. at 270-71.
18. Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures Market in Bodily
Organs, 55 O-Ho ST. L.J. 1,9 (1994).
19. Anderson, supra note 8, at 258.
20. Kumit, supra note 8, at 427-28.
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organs-some get organs and some are refused. As a result, patients who feel
they can no longer wait for an organ, and can afford the increased cost, may
turn to the black market for organs.2' The problems caused by this black
market are increasingly international as people with funds travel between
countries to search for needed organs.' Countries that provide a surplus of
organs invariably are the ones with the least restrictions on trade in organs,
thereby producing an international market that generates human rights
violations and organ sales by the poor.' Additionally, organs procured in these
markets often do not meet the quality standards found in the patient's home
country. 4 Increasing the supply of available organs in other nations is crucial
to ameliorating the problems of the international black market and its human
rights abuses, as well as providing organs for all who may need them. This can
be easily seen if one considers a situation where domestic supply meets
domestic demand. In such a situation, people would not travel abroad to a risky
market to purchase an illegally obtained organ at an increased price.
If the crucial variable in solving the organ transplant problem is the
increased supply of organs, does such a potential pool exist? In short, the
answer is yes. An estimated 20,000 usable cadavers are buried each year
without having had any of their organs harvested. 6 These cadavers could
provide 40,000 kidneys and 20,000 hearts, livers, and lung pairs.27
Unfortunately, most people die without donating their organs. Current data
from the Center for Disease Control suggests that only fifteen percent of people
actually become organ donors.2 This is simply not enough.
Enough organs exist to make substantial inroads into reducing, if not
completely eliminating, the organ deficit. The problem is that most systems for
acquiring and distributing organs are woefully inadequate. That people die
every day of incurable disease is an awful truth. However, it is unacceptable
that there are needless deaths from curable diseases when there is a potentially
available supply of the materials (in the case of transplant--organs) that would
eliminate these needless deaths. A system of organ transplantation must be
designed and put in place that harnesses donative incentives to increase the
21. Williams, supra note 14, at 316.
22. Id. at 320.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 322.
25. Id.
26. Crespi, supra note 18, at 10, Silver, supra note 12, at 687.
27. Silver, supra note 12, at 687.
28. Clark, supra note 8, at 931.
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supply of organs, thereby eliminating the need for waiting lists and factors used
to decide that one person should live and simultaneously consign another to
death.
III. THE UNITED STATES ORGAN DONATION SYSTEM
In the United States, several criteria are used to ration access to organ
transplants. These criteria are necessary due to the shortage of organs for
transplantation. To increase the chances of a successful transplant, it is
preferable that cadavers be brain dead, but still have a beating heart, be younger
than fifty-five, and have an organ free from infection or metastatic cancer.29
Live kidney donors must be between fifteen and eighty, have two healthy,
properly functioning kidneys, and be medically compatible with the recipient. 0
All that is required of a recipient is that the recipient be suffering from organ
failure, free of infection or cancer, and able to tolerate surgery."
Unfortunately, due to the shortage of organs, two or more people are often
medically ready and capable of a transplant, but there is only one organ to give.
As a result, physicians and other medical personnel make the choice by
weighing the patients' social worth. Criteria include some family-related
considerations such as marital status and number of dependents; other criteria
are income, educational background, employment record, relationship to
authority figures, past irresponsible behavior, and intelligence." A system, that
decides who lives and dies based on considerations such as income and
education is unfortunate and may lead to inequitable results. A significant
increase in the supply of organs would cure the shortage in organs, thereby
eliminating the necessity for a system of criteria to decide who receives organs
and who does not. Several different methods have been proposed to eliminate
the organ shortage. These include systems of encouraged voluntarism and
29. Clive 0. Callender, Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding Transplantation: The Transplant Team
Perspective, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: SOCIETAL, MEDICAL-LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND
REIMBURSEMENT ISSUES 42,42 (Dale H. Cowan et al. eds., 1987). In the process of metastasis, "small clusters
of cancerous cells dislodge from a tumor, invade the blood or lymphatic vessels, and are carried to other tissues,
where they continue to proliferate. In this way a primary tumor at one site can give rise to a secondary tumor
at another site." JANIS KUav, IMMUNOLOGY 506 (1992).
30. Callender, supra note 29, at 42.
31. Id. at 43.
32. Banks, supra note 6, at 63. See also NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
TRANSPLANTATIONINNEW YORK STATE: THE PRO-JREMENTANDDISTRIBUTIONOFORGANSANDTISSUES (1988).
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presumed consent, among others to be discussed later. One suggested method
allows people to sell their organs.
In order to sell their organs, people would need some recognized ownership
or property right in their own bodies and their component parts. This raises the
question: what is the nature of property rights in the human body? The
prevailing view is that a modicum of property rights exist in human cadavers.3
The English common law recognized a right to bury one's dead, termed a
"quasi-right in property," which remains the rule in the United States. 4 Cogent
arguments have also been made that rights existing in relation to the body
strongly resemble property rights, such as the prohibition of slavery and false
imprisonment, the ability to contract for employment, and the existence of
assault and battery laws. Historically, people have not been allowed to
alienate the parts or sum of their bodies to others. The property rights that
inhere in an object are often characterized as a bundle of sticks. A person need
not possess all the sticks in the bundle to enjoy the ownership ofproperty. With
human materials, people certainly own them, but lack the stick which
encompasses the right to sell.3 As we shall see, under existing law in the United
States and most other countries, the right to sell is absent.
The system of organ procurement in the United States is set out in various
legislative acts. In this legislation, the United States recognizes a shortage of
organs for transplantation and attempts to correct the deficit. The remainder of
this section will discuss the 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, its 1987
revision, and the National Organ Transplant Act, along with some criticisms
levied against the current U.S. system of organ procurement.
A. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
In an attempt to curtail the shortage of organs for transplant, on July 30,
1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
33. Paul A. Gerike, Human Biological Material: A Proprietary Interest or Part of the Monistic Being?,
17 OtnoN.U. L. REv. 805,812 (1991).
34. Id.
35. Danielle M. Wagner, Property Rights in the Human Body: The Commercialization of Organ
Transplantation and Biotechnology, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 931,933 (1995).
36. Id. at 934; Gerike, supra note 33, at 810.
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approved the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) 7 This Act gives anyone
who is at least eighteen years of age and mentally competent the right to
designate whether or not he will donate his organs for transplantation after
death. 8 This version of the UAGA neither expressly allowed nor prohibited the
sale of human organs. 9 It did, however, restrict who was allowed to be the
recipient of organs to "hospitals, doctors, medical and dental schools,
universities, organ and tissue banks, and any specified individual in need of a
transplant."40
In practice, the impact of the UAGA was very modest. Although, under the
UAGA, the deceased's decision whether to donate does not require the approval
of the next of kin, it has been the general practice of physicians to inquire as to
the next of kin's preferences concerning donation and not to proceed with the
harvest of organs absent their approval.4' In essence, the UAGA promoted a
system of encouraged voluntarism. This system was "lauded because it
'encourage[d] socially desirable virtues such as altruism and benevolence
without running the risk of abusing individual rights. ' ' 4 However, it was
quickly realized that the UAGA failed to address many of the problems
concerning the organ shortage, resulting in the continued existence of this
deficit. Generally, three problems were thought to prevent an increase in organ
donation.
The first problem is the personal reluctance of individuals to donate
organs.43 The reasons for this reluctance vary and are numerous: denial of
mortality; fear that the medical community will not use every effort to save the
donor patient's life in order to harvest the patient's organs; opposition to organ
donation stemming from a religious belief or the belief that the surviving family
should decide the question; and disgust at the idea of having an organ
37. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (Final Draft), reprinted in STATUTORY REGULATION OF ORGAN
DONATION INTHE UNITED STATES I (R. Hunter Manson ed., 2d ed. 1986).
38. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law: Organ Transplantation, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1614, 1617 (1990).
39. Gerike, supra note 33, at 813.
40. Kumit, supra note 8, at 410.
4 1. Anderson, supra note 8, at 264.
42. Kumit, supra note 8, at 426.
43. Id. at 428.
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removed." While some of these problems are largely intractable (religious
belief, denial of mortality), some can be solved at least in part. For example,
the fear that doctors will not do everything in their power to save the life of a
donor can be dealt with through an educational campaign. Donors can be
alerted that most nations adhere to the Guiding Principles announced by the
World Health Organization for organ transplantation. Guiding Principle 2
declares: "Physicians determining that the death of a potential donor has
occurred should not be directly involved in organ removal from the donor and
subsequent transplantation procedures, or be responsible for the care of
potential recipients of such organs." The problem with the altruistic system
is that it merely states that people should donate their organs in spite of their
fears. One key then, to increasing the supply of organs, is a system that (1)
educates potential donors as to which fears are unfounded and (2) provides
people incentives to set aside their fears.
A second problem with encouraged voluntarism is that when a patient
dies-with or without a donor card-the next of kin is often reluctant to
authorize the donation of the deceased's organs.' There are many reasons why
this occurs, even if the deceased has made his or her wishes to donate clearly
known during life. The family may be traumatized emotionally and
psychologically by the sudden death of their loved one and therefore unable to
consent to organ removal; the family may fear that authorizing organ removal
after death is symbolic of giving up hope of recovery if the patient is still alive;
and the family might deny that the patient is actually dead as a result of a
still-functioning heart or other functioning bodily systems, although the patient
is actually brain dead."'
A third problem, and one that the Commissioners attempted to address
through revisions to the UAGA, was medical personnel's failure to ask the next
44. Id. at 428-29.
45. HuMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: A REPORTON DEVELOPMENTS UNDERTHEAUSPICES OF WHO
(1987-1991) 8 (World Health Organization ed., 1991).
46. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 429. Recall that, although the 1968 UAGA did not require the consent of the
next of kin, many doctors would seek it. Notwithstanding the legal immunity provided to physicians acting in
accordance with organ donor cards, physicians include the next ofkin in the decisionmaking process to avoid
harm to their reputations or the reputation of the medical community in general. Monique C. Gorsline &
Rachelle L. Johnson, The United States System of Organ Donation, The International Solution, and the
Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: "And the Winner is. , 20 J. CORP. L. 5,32 (1995).
47. Kurit, supra note 8, at 429.
1998]
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of kin whether they would agree to donate the deceased's organs.48 This
problem is widespread; many, if not most, physicians either feel that the family
should not be approached with the subject immediately following the death of
a loved one or are inadequately trained in how to handle such a delicate
situation. 9 Additionally, if the physician does seek the request of the family and
it is refused, the organs generally will not be harvested, even if the deceased
possessed a valid organ donor's card.50 The Commissioners attempted to deal
with these problems-especially that of the physician's failure to request
donation-with the 1987 revisions to the UAGA.
B. The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The 1987 revisions to the UAGA made two important changes. First, the
revisions expressly prohibited the sale of human organs for transplantation
purposes."' This section of the Act reads as follows: "A person may not
knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchase or sell a part for
transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to occur after the
death of the decedent. 52
This change was important in that, for the first time, the sale of human
organs was expressly prohibited. Second, the UAGA now included provisions
for routine inquiry." Under routine inquiry, a physician is required to notify the
hospital of a potential organ donor.' A member of the hospital staff will then
follow up by informing the family of its options concerning donation of the
deceased's organs."
Many observers feel that routine inquiry has not adequately addressed the
problems of the 1968 UAGA. As an alternative, they suggest the United States
adopt a system referred to as required request. "[U]nder a required request
system, an individual must indicate his wish concerning organ donation at
48. Id.
49. Id. at 430.
50. Id.
51. Brian G. Hannemann, Body Parts and Property Rights: A New Commodity for the 1990s, 22 Sw.
U. L. REv. 399,410 (1993).
52. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 10(a), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE REPSONSES TO ORGAN
TA NSPLANrrAToN388,409(World Health Organization ed., 1994). Underthe 1987 UAGA, "part" is defined
as meaning "an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, or other portion of the human body." Id. at 389.
53. Kumit, supra note 8, at 418.
54. Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1620.
55.Id.
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certain designated instances, such as driver's license renewal or submission of
tax returns... ; [h]ospitals too could be required to ask about donation as part
of the admissions process ... ."6 Proponents believed that required request
could address the organ procurement problem by institutionalizing the request,
requiring that that inquiry be made by trained personnel." Proponents argue
that the large number of patients in waiting lists demonstrates the failure of
routine inquiry.
Practical shortcomings have thwarted the UAGA attempts-in both the
1968 and revised 1987 versions-to increase the supply of organ donors. An
initial problem in both versions concerns the inefficiency of donor cards. To
show intent, donors must carry donor cards, but only three percent of organ
donors are actually carrying their cards when they die. 8 An additional problem,
as mentioned above, is that if the family refuses to authorize the removal of
organs, physicians will not proceed, even if the deceased has a signed organ
donor card. 9 Although routine inquiry was added in the 1987 UAGA to cure
this ill, it also suffers from shortcomings. First, it is not always applied. If the
physician makes a subjective judgment that the family is too distraught to be
confronted with the inquiry, he may abstain.' A second drawback to routine
inquiry is that by creating a system that requires the family to be asked about
donation, the revision loses sight of the initial underlying purpose of the UAGA:
to allow the individual to govern the disposition of his or her own body.6
The 1968 UAGA and its 1987 revisions were adopted in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia.6 However, the organ shortage problem continues.
It is apparent that a new approach is needed.
C. The National Organ Transplant Act
The federal government jumped headlong into the organ transplantation
quagmire with the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), enacted by
Congress in 1984 with two interrelated foundations: to make the sale of human
56. Id. at 1622.
57. James F. Blumstein, The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care: The Case of Commerce in
Transplantable Organs, 3 HALTH MATix 1, 5 (1993).
58. Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1619.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1621.
61. Id.
62. Gene A. Pierce, Introduction to STATrroRYREGLATIONOFORGANDNATIONNTHEUN1TEDSTATES
v, v (R. Hunter Manson, ed., 1986); Gerike, supra note 28, at 813.
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organs a federal offense and to announce that the U.S. system for organ
procurement would operate as a system of voluntary donations.63  The
prohibitive provision reads:
Under subsection (a) of Sec. 301, it is unlawful for any person
to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.
Penal provisions are laid down in subsection (b). 4
Although Congress expressly prohibited the recognition of property rights
in human organs, they exempted sales of replenishable tissues like blood and
sperm from NOTA.' Because studies concluded that "society's moral values
militate against regarding the body as a commodity....", Congress enacted
NOTA to establish a commitment to altruism.6
D. Criticisms of the US. System of Organ Procurement
Although the U.S. system of organ procurement has gone through several
modifications, all changes and "improvements" share one thing in common:
they all failed to increase the supply of organs. Statistics concerning organ
donation showthat people in the United States do not always practice what they
preach. "[O]ver sixty percent of Americans claim they would donate their own
organs and over eighty-five percent claim they would donate the organ of a
loved one, yet only four percent of American citizens carry organ donor
cards.1
67
In addition to the myriad problems with the donor card system cited above,
the ineffectiveness of the current system is also rooted in many logistical
problems: emergency personnel often fail to discover written directives
concerning organ donation; organ procurement agencies have inefficient
procedures in obtaining donor referrals; organs are wasted because they are not
placed in time; and death pronouncements are not communicated to the next of
63. Williams, supra note 14, at 330.
64. The National Organ Transplant Act (Pub. L. No. 98-507), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 52, at 388.
65. Gerike, supra note 33, at 814.
66. Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1622-23.
67. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 8.
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kin in a timely manner." Most of these problems continue because the system
currently in place offers no incentives for people to donate their organs prior to
death. Rather, the system is triggered by the moment of death-the moment of
grief-when authorities seek to discover whetherthe deceased had the intentto
donate or whether the families feel that donation would or would not be
objectionable. For a system to efficiently encourage donation, it needs to create
incentives to make a rational choice to donate well before death.
Many suggestions have been made to improve or replace the current system.
These ideas range from a system of mandated choice, the required request
system, to a system where the surviving family is required to consent to the
decedent's pre-death wishes.69 Many countries have tried these systems of
increasing organ supply as well as other systems not yet discusssed.
Unfortunately, none have shown any significant ability to solve the shortage.
IV. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
A. Introduction
Two systems of organ procurement have been examined thus far. The first
was unregulated commercialization of bodies and their parts, exhibited by
"body-snatching" and the murders by William Burke. This system allowed
people to engage in free trade, but may generate terrible consequences. The
second system is the one employed in the United States today. It does not allow
the free alienation of the body or any nonreplenishable part thereof.
Additionally, it does not allow organ harvesting absent the consent of the donor,
the next of kin, or both. The above discussed systems claim to be concerned
primarily with the individual's consent. At the opposite end of the spectrum are
those systems that allow organ harvesting even in the absence of consent. These
systems are implemented in China and in the European Union.
While in some limited instances the United States has allowed sale of body
parts, the nations of Europe are virtually unanimous in the illegality of the sale
68. Id. at 31-32.
69. Anderson, supra note 8, at 269-70.
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for profit of human body parts.70 "The latest Western laws, particularly in
Europe, indicate that a more preemptory social outlook has already developed,
under which consent is no longer required before body parts may be removed
from the dead."'" The systems in these nations are referred to as "presumed
consent" systems. They too have failed to cure the organ shortage.
On the other extreme is the Chinese system, which possibly has engaged in
horrific human rights abuses in allegedly executing prisoners in order to harvest
their organs. Finally, this section will address the arguments of those who
advocate a system creating a market in bodily organs. The advantages and
disadvantages of commercialization will be considered.
B. Presumed Consent
Many European Union countries have adopted the "presumed consent"
system for organ procurement." This system presumes the decedent has
consented to the harvest of his or her organs following death unless that
decedent has recorded his or her objection to such a harvest.73 Presumed
consent as a method of increasing organ supply was chosen over
commercializatiori because "[t]rade in human organs is ... inconsistent with the
EU objective of a high level of consumer protection [and] the negative opinion
of the European Parliament on commercialisation of organs is well known. '
Other countries have also found favor with the system of presumed consent.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and pre-war Yugoslavia have adopted this system as
well."
Although the European Union chose a different system of organ
procurement than the United States, the countries of the Union were confronted
with many of the same problems as the United States. For instance, the people
of Europe, much like the United States, overwhelmingly support organ
donation, but few actually carry donor cards. In describing the problem, one
European commentator noted:
70. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 3.
71.1d at24.
72. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Gorsline & Johnson,
supra note 46, at 21-23.
73. Kumit, supra note 8, at 418.
74. H.D.C. Roscam Abbing, Organ Transplantation: Challenges for the EU, in ORGAN AND TISSUE
TRANSPLANTATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 6, at 20.
75. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 24.
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It is safe to claim that most people think that we have a moral
obligation to help others in need. It seems equally obvious that
organ donation is an instance of helping. However, in
everyday morality organ donation could be better described as
supererogatory: it is admirable if they do it, but we cannot
reasonably expect people to do so. 6
This, as noted earlier, is the same problem experienced in the United States.
The European Union's response has been to presume consent, thereby
eliminating the necessity of carrying cards. One difference between the E.U.
system and the U.S. system is the degree to which the systems rely on the
autonomy of the individual. The United States system of encouraged
voluntarism seeks a level of compatibility between people's moral beliefs, in
supporting the idea of organ donation, and their personal actions, deciding
whether or not to donate; by contrast many people in Europe feel the opposite."
Some Europeans feel "[t]he problem with the procedures for organ retrieval
presently in use is that they want simultaneously to express the moral status of
organ donation and to respect the opinion of the person."' Confronted with a
choice between the morality of organ donation and the autonomy of the
individual, European countries sacrificed the ideal of personal autonomy for a
system of presumed consent.
Many variations of the presumed consent model are employed in the
European Union. Some countries have adopted a weak system that inquires into
the wishes of the surviving family. 9 Other countries have implemented a much
stronger system; organs are removed the moment a patient dies if there is no
known objection to the harvest from the deceased individual. In some countries
this may occur regardless ofwhether the surviving family objects.' To see how
variant operations of the presumed consent system work, the organ procurement
systems of France, Belgium, and Austria will be examined.
76. G.Pennings, Ethics ofOrgan Retrieval, in ORrANANDTISsuETRANSPLANTAnONINTHE EUROPEAN
UNIoN, supra note 6, at 166.
77. Id. at 167.
78. Id.
79. See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 21-24.
80. ld. at 21-22.
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1. Presumed Consent in France
France adopted a system of presumed consent in 1976 by passing the
Caillavet Law, under which "a person may 'opt-out' from donating organs
simply by signing a writing to that effect."'" Specifically, the law states:
Organs may be removed for therapeutic or scientific purposes
from cadavers of persons who have not, during their lifetime,
indicated their refusal to permit such a procedure. However,
where the cadaver is that of a minor or of an incompetent
person, organs may be removed for transplantation purposes
only with the authorization of the person's legal
representative. 2
In practice, France is an example of a weak system of presumed consent.
The procedure for harvesting organs under the Caillavet Law was set out in
Decree No. 78-501 on March 31, 1978, and begins with the decision of
potential donors as to whether or not to opt-out of the presumed consent
system.83 Ifthe option of donation is not chosen, they, or anyone witnessing the
patient's objection, may register the objection in a hospital register maintained
for that purpose." Prior to harvesting the organs, the physician is required to
check the register to ensure there has been no objection." Even if there is no
objection recorded in the register, the physician is still prohibited from removing
the deceased's organs if he learns of an objection through another writing or a
third person."6 This system requires that a reasonable effort be made to
determine the individual's wishes-ifthere were any objections-but does not
place a premium on seeking the wishes of the next of kin.87
Today, some twenty years after its adoption, the Caillavet law may claim
some meager success. The number of transplantations in France has steadily
increased and the country now claims one of the top six rates of postmortem
81. Williams, supra note 14, at 338-39.
82. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 52, at 199, 200.
83. Id.
84. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 421-22.
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donors per million inhabitants among European countries."8 However, these
rates may not adequately reflect the results that a vigorous system of presumed
consent would reflect. France's practice of inquiring as to the next of kin's
wishes in 90.7% of cases causes this system to operate more like a voluntary
system of organ procurement. 9
Even regarding these numbers, France's system has failed to achieve the
goal of closing the gap on the organ deficit. In 1988, twelve years after the
adoption of presumed consent, France transplanted 1,808 kidneys and had
4,075 patients on the waiting list; 555 heart transplants and 523 patients on the
waiting list; 409 liver transplants and 189 patients on the waiting list; 67 lung
transplants and 163 patients on the waiting list; and 43 pancreas transplants and
16 patients on the waiting list.' At least in France, presumed consent has failed
to provide the organs needed.
2. Presumed Consent in Belgium
Much like the law in France, the Belgian law of presumed consent is
watered down. Belgium implemented its presumed consent law in 1987
following its passage in 1986."' Belgium's provision for the harvest of organs
reads:
Organs and tissues for transplantation, and for the preparation
of therapeutic substances in accordance with the conditions
laid down in Section 2, may be removed from the body of any
person recorded in the Register of the Population or any person
recorded for more than six months in the Aliens Register,
unless it is established that an objection to such a removal has
been expressed.'
88. Id. at 442.
89. Id. at 443.
90. Altman, supra note 5, at 168-170.
91. Kumit, supra note 8, at 422.
92. LAWOF 13 JuNE 1986oNTHEREmovALANDTRANSPLANTAONOFORGANS, reprintedinLEGISLATTvE
RESPONSES TO ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 133 (World Health Organization ed., 1994).
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Individual objections to organ harvesting are registered through a computerized
central Health Authority registry which is accessible to all transplant centers.93
"Although, like the French law, the Belgian law allows doctors to remove
organs without familial consent, in practice Belgian doctors also inform families
of their option to refuse and ask if they object."'
Like France, Belgium has experienced some success, though not complete.
By 1990, total organs procured had increased by 183%. 9' However, some
observers have noted that this increase could be the result of the increased
number of medical and hospital programs participating in the transplant
program as opposed to the actual system of presumed consent.' In 1988,
Belgium had 342 kidney transplants with 803 patients waiting; 96 heart
transplants with 34 patients waiting; 123 liver transplants with 35 patients
waiting; 4 lung transplants with 4 patients waiting; and 5 pancreas transplants
with 12 patients waiting.97
3. Presumed Consent in Austria
Austria's system works in somewhat differently from those of France and
Belgium. In operation, it. is probably the closest thing to a pure system of
presumed consent. The law in Austria reads much like the laws in France and
Belgium.
It shall be permissible to remove organs or parts of organs
from deceased persons in order, by means of their
transplantation, to save the life or restore the health of another
person. Such removal shall be prohibited ifthe physicians are
in possession of a declaration in which the deceased person or,
prior to his death, his legal representative, has expressly
refused his consent to organ donation.98
93. Kumit, supra note 8, at 423.
94. id.
95. Id. at 444.
96. Id.
97. Altman, supra note 5, at 168-170.
98. FEDERAL LAW OF 1 JUNE 1982 (Serial No. 273), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 92, at 132, 132.
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In Austria, a doctor may remove organs in any instance where the deceased
has not made known their objection; may proceed without consulting the next
of kin; and, if the next of kin is reluctant to donate or refuses, may and often
will ignore these objections." Additionally, an objection must be made in
writing to be proper legally; however, unlike in France, the physician is under
no duty to make a reasonable effort to find these writings.'I
As a result of this pure system, Austria has fared much better than most
other nations in procuring organs. Sixty cadaveric kidneys are retrieved for
every one million persons; this rate of procurement is twice that of the United
States and most other European countries."°' Although these results are often
lauded as evidence that a strictly run system of presumed consent actually
works in increasing the supply of organs, opponents argue the system is not
responsible for the increase in organs. One observer notes: "If Austria's high
rates of procurement were due only to its presumed consent law, one would
expect it to outpace other countries in all categories of organs covered by the
law. This, however, is not the case."'" As compared to France and Belgium,
Austria's harvest rates are only slightly higher concerning livers, and are
actually lower concerning hearts.0 3 Although many proponents and opponents
of presumed consent may agree that the Austrian system has increased the
organ harvest, it still runs a shortage of organs. In 1988, Austria had 270
kidney transplants with 1,116 patients waiting; 46 heart transplants with 15
patients waiting; 32 liver transplants with 10 patients waiting; 3 lung
transplants with 8 patients waiting; and 8 pancreas transplants with 12 patients
waiting.
4. Advantages of Presumed Consent
Presumed consent appears to procure organs more effectively than other
systems. France, Belgium, and Austria all have higher procurement rates than
99. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 67, at 22.
100. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 423.
101. Williams, supra note 14, at 340.
102. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 445.
103. Id.
104. Altman, supra note 5, at 168-69.
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the United States or other countries with systems of encouraged voluntarism.'
The proponents of a presumed consent system stress its several advantages.
The system eliminates many logistical and practical problems: the need to carry
organ donor cards; the need for health care professionals to inflict further grief
on family members by asking them to agree to a harvest; and, in countries like
France and Belgium where doctors still involve the family, the problems caused
by doctors who are reluctant to ask for consent and therefore get poor results."°
Additionally, the system provides individuals with ample opportunity (at any
time during their life) to register their lersonal objections to prevent organ
harvest. Because the decision not to donate is made during a time of calm,
rather than a time of grief and severe emotional distress, the decision made is
more examined. 7
5. Disadvantages of Presumed Consent
Systems of presumed consent are not without their problems and criticisms.
Like other implemented systems, the most pressing practical problem lies in
their failure to increase organ supply to sufficiently eradicate organ shortages.
The most pressing ethical problem with the presumed consent systems is its
impairment of individual autonomy and freedom. An ideal system would
address both problems by serving two goals: (1) increasing organ supply to
eliminate the organ shortage, while (2) preserving maximum autonomy for the
individual.
Presumed consent falls short of increasing supply because in practice it
often operates much like a system of encouraged voluntarism; examples are
France and Belgium where the wishes of the family are made known." 8 By
contrast, proponents of the presumed consent system argue that the decision is
taken out of the family's hands because the individual has ample time to register
105. Williams, supra note 14, at 341.
106. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 434-35.
107. Id. at 435.
108. This is not to say that a system of presumed consent is more desirous than one of encouraged
voluntarism. Rather, advocacy lies with neither system as they both fail to procure a supply of organs as great
as the demand.
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an objection."°  However, this would not seem to be the case. Under the
presumed consent system, in countries such as France and Belgium, the family
is, for all intents and purposes, granted an opportunity to halt an operation that
would proceed without their objection-a decision that is no less traumatic than
deciding whether to allow the deceased's organs to be donated. ' 0 Also, the
system may not have much impact on increasing donations because families
who objected under the old system will still object under the new one."'
Another criticism of presumed consent encompasses its impact on human rights
abuses: "the poor, the uneducated, and the legally disenfranchised might bear
a disadvantageous burden, and only the more advantaged groups would exercise
autonomy, since only the more advantaged groups would be aware of their right
to opt-out."".. Also, presumed consent eliminates the socially desirable concept
and attitude of altruism."' In addition, the danger is always present that a
person who has registered an objection to organ removal will nevertheless have
organs harvested from his or her body."4 This would more likely happen in
systems of strict presumed consent where a doctor is not required to make a
reasonable search to determine whether an individual has opted-out of the
system. This unwanted removal is a serious affront to individual autonomy.
Many "[c]ritics of presumed consent feel that such a system is overly
coercive and antithetical to the values of a democratic society since it appears
to devalue freedom of choice.." This is especially apparent in the United
States where opinion polls show a widespread dislike for and opposition to a
system of presumed consent."6 It would seem the opposition in the United
States to presumed consent comes not only from the public, but from the courts
as well. In the United States, a presumed consent system is used for cornea
transplants-a practice that has resulted in many lawsuits."7 "[I1n the most
recent case of Brotherton v. Cleveland, the court held that the practice of
removing corneas from the deceased's eyes without even examining the patient's
109. Anderson, supra note 8, at 259.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 260.
112. Williams, supra note 14, at 343.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Kurnit, supra note 8, at 436.
116. Anderson, supra note 8, at 261.
117. Id.
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medical records ... was an unconstitutional deprivation of property interests
without due process of law.""' 8
Europe is moving away from systems of presumed consent."9 Many people
are inherently dubious ofthe notion that silence equals consent, especially when
the practical result of such a system is removal of an individual's organs even
when his or her objections are known. 20 Some have also argued that it is
unwise to ignore the wishes of the family as they are the ones who will be
emotionally impacted the most from this experience. Presumed consent fails to
sufficiently recognize the importance of individual autonomy; thus, unless we
are prepared to advocate control of the body by the state following death, we
should seek the approval of families of the deceased rather than avoiding
them.'
In summary, presumed consent systems (1) have somewhat increased the
number of organs procured, and (2) caused many philosophical problems that
need to be avoided to make a truly effective, efficient, and fair system of organ
procurement.
C. Nationalization of Cadavers
Another method ofprocuring organs for transplant, albeit one seldom used,
is the nationalization of cadavers. In the few countries that have adopted this
method, very substantial human rights violations have occurred. The most
common of these human rights violations occur when the state removes the
organs of criminals by methods of state execution. ' An example of this sort
of state-sponsored crime comes from Bosnia, where a Bush administration
study reports that a Serbian internment camp doctor is alleged to have killed
prisoners of war to remove their organs.'2
China provides an example of state-sponsored execution for organs. China
has officially allowed the harvest of organs from executed prisoners since
118. Id. at 261-62.
119. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 35.
120. Id. at 22.
121. Anderson, supra note 8, at 263-64.
122. Williams, supra note 14, at 323.
123. Id. at 324.
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1984.124 By Chinese law, harvest is allowed in one of three circumstances: (1)
if the prisoner's body is not claimed; (2) if the prisoner has consented; or (3) if
the prisoner's family has consented.'25
China, however, has not always adhered to its own laws. Executions of
condemned prisoners appear to be scheduled around transplant needs and, in
some instances, even deliberately botched so the prisoners will still be alive
when their organs are removed. 6 The carrying out of state-sponsored
executions without public notice or witnesses facilitates China's ability to
execute prisoners for the purpose of obtaining their organs.'27
Although many of the China stories sound incredible, they are not without
support. Numerous reports of these practices have been confirmed not only by
doctors and judges witnessing the executions, but by members of the Chinese
Communist Party as well.'28 A Chinese government document explains the
procedures to be used in this practice which harvests 2,000 to 3,000 organs per
year. 129
The use of the corpses or organs of executed criminals must
be kept strictly secret, and attention must be paid to
avoiding negative repercussions. [The removal of organs]
should normally be carried out within the utilizing unit.
Where it is genuinely necessary, then with the permission of
the people's court that is carrying out the death sentence, a
surgical vehicle from the health department may be
124. Laura-Hill M. Patton, A Califor Common Sense: Organ Donation and the Executed Prisoner,
3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 387, 425 (1996).
125. Id.
126. Allison Owen, Death Row Inmates or Organ Donors: China's Source of Body Organs for
Medical Transplantation, 5 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 495, 495 (1995).
127. Patton, supra note 124, at 426.
128. Owen, supra note 126, at 496. Recently, Harry Wu, a human rights activist who has spent several
years in Chinese prisons, released a videotape of Chinese nationals bargaining for the sale of organs ofexecuted
Chinese prisoners for tens of thousands of dollars; this videotape led to the arrest in early March, 1998 of two
men, one of whom was a former Chinese prosecutor. See Christine Gorman, Body Partsfor Sale, TIME, March
9, 1998, at 76.
The idea of bartering for the organs of prisoners has, in fact, begun to find limited support in legislatures
in the United States (although not of the same sort of conscription system as is found in China). An example
of this is the "Life for a Life" bill recently introduced in the Missouri state legislature. This proposal would
allow "death row inmates to donate a kidney or bone marrow in exchange for a commutation to life in prison;"
however, the bill was rejected by the House Criminal Law Committee by a 13-2 vote. "Life-for-a life" Bill
Dies in Missouri House Committee, JOPuN GLOBE, April 10, 1998, at CI.
129. Owen, supra note 125, at 496.
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permitted to drive onto the execution grounds to remove the
organs, but it is not permitted to use a vehicle bearing
health department insignia or to wear white clothing.
Guards must remain around the execution grounds while the
operation for organ removal is going on. 30
Because the process of harvesting organs from prisoners is shrouded in
absolute secrecy, it is impossible to accurately estimate how many organs are
procured each year in China's system. However, even if a system of
nationalization was able to close the gap between organs needed and organs
supplied, killing human beings for their organs is no solution to the problem.
The ends do not justify the means. China is a member of the United Nations
and a signatory to the U.N. Charter and "the act oftaking organs from prisoners
without their consent is not consistent with the purposes and principles of the
Charter.''. It is painfully obvious from the experience in China and Serbiathat
nationalization as an organ procurement plan should be completely avoided.
D. Commercialization of Human Organs
The antithesis of nationalization is commercialization of human
organs-creating a market-based system of organ trade. Across the globe, the
sale of human organs is considered an unethical practice.' The ramifications
of commercialization are discussed at greater length in the proposal section,
which advocates a limited commercialization of organs.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Introduction
Despite various methods of organ procurement throughout the world, organ
shortages expand and it appears they will continue to do so. This is partially
due to the increasing pace of developing new medical technologies and in
enhancing existing technologies. In the last decade, the development of organ
transplantation has progressed so rapidly that today transplants are considered
130. Id. at 496-97.
131. Id. at 502-03.
132. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 28.
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more a matter of public expectation than medical marvel.' To cite one
example, the incidence of organ transplantation rose in France from 685 in 1980
to 3,221 in 1992.134 While the need for organs continues to increase, procuring
organs remains a difficult, almost stagnant, task. One reason for the impasse
is the low number of donors. Potential donors are only a small percentage of
the total medical patient population and are therefore often lost in routine
patient care.'35 Such obstacles are fatal to the success of any organ procurement
system. When the system fails to reach potential donors, their organs remain
in the buried cadaver and the potential to save a life is wasted. The organ
transplantation problem is a shortage of available supply, not one of potential
supply. "[T]here are more than enough deaths of potential donors in the United
States-20,000 of two million deaths per year are of potential donors.' 13 6 A
system is needed to efficiently harvest these organs.
Many ideas have been suggested to improve the current system. An
example is the UAGA's revision to include routine inquiry. One illustrative step
requires physicians to reach out to these patients in an educational effort to aid
in the "recognition and referral of potential organ donors to the organ
procurement network."'" However, even these referrals will not solve the
shortage of organs if the correct system is not in place. If the current U.S.
system were to be used, donors might be made more aware of organ donation,
but that would do nothing to help change or override the concerns that prevent
people from donating today. The current system is the problem and it will not
be rehabilitated by further tinkering; a new system is needed.
For any organ procurement system to be successful, it must allow for the
acquisition of enough materials to meet the demands of the community.'38 The
current systems have failed at this goal of maximization; a reason for this is the
failure of the laws which govern these systems. Acute and persistent shortages
133. P. Romano & J. Hors, The Transplant European Computer NetworkProject, in ORGAN ANDTISSuE
TRANSPLANTATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 6, at 117.
134. Id.
135. Luke Skelley, Practical Issues in Obtaining Organs for Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 29, at 262.
136. Callender, supra note 29, at 46.
137. Skelley, supra note 135, at 262.
138. See SCOTr, supra note 1, at 82. See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: OR,
ALTRUISM RUN AMUCK 5 (1993).
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of organs represent the inadequacy of existing laws.39 The challenge then
remains one of determining the best method of increasing the supply of organs
while remaining true to the second goal of organ procurement: avoiding human
rights abuses and encroachments on personal autonomy.
While medicine advances and the organ deficit continues to grow there is
reason to believe the true shortage may be worse than most think. One
commentator notes that the majority of liver transplantations are performed in
children with congenital defects and may be expanded to include tens of
thousands of potential patients if liver transplantation should prove to be an
effective therapeutic option for adults with cirrhosis of the liver. 4 Problems
like this will require new, innovative solutions.
As previously mentioned, another drawback of the current U.S. system is
the inequity that arises under organ rationing since rationing mechanisms and
criteria used are wholly inadequate. 4' Deciding who lives and who dies based
on criteria-such as education and employment background-should be
troubling. Organ procurement policies in the United States do not successfully
work toward the goals which a procurement system should. The forces of
altruism work too spasmodically to generate an adequate, sustained organ
supply. 42 It is crucial that a change in the system come soon.
B. The Middleman Approach
The most effective way to increase the supply of organs will involve limited
commercialization of bodily components. The central idea to this approach is
the existence of a middleman in the market of bodily organs. By contracting
with individuals for their organs, this middleman entity will harness market
incentives in order to acquire organs. Additionally, the regulation of this entity,
especially during the process of organ distribution, will help ensure that no
139. ScoTr, supra note I, at 82.
140. Arthur L. Caplan, Sounding Board: Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaver
Organs for Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 29, at 273.
141. EPSTEIN, supra note 138, at 4.
142. Id. at 8.
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rights violations occur. The proposed system will operate on a few basic
principles.'43
1. The "middleman" entity would be licensed to purchase
organs from individuals who are willing to sell. Only these
entities, and no others, would be allowed to purchase organs.
2. The "middleman" entity would be the only entity from which
a patient in need of a transplant could acquire an organ
(excepting cases of altruistic gifts between live donors).
3. For organ procurement to operate on a global scale and
avoid jurisdictional issues, these "middleman" entities would
need to be private firms, licensed to procure and distribute
organs.
An individual willing to sell his organs would contract with the organ
procurement agency, authorizing the removal of the organ if the donor dies in
such circumstances as to make removal possible for financial consideration.'"
This money should be paid only upon removal of the organ. This way, if the
donor's organs are not made available for harvesting following death, actions
by the middleman entity for restitution or specific performance may be avoided.
In particular, specific performance should be considered untenable.
If specific performance is the remedy, society would be
outraged that individuals would be forced to donate an organ.
Not only is specific performance unethical, but it goes against
public policy and cultural norms. Thus, if money is found to be
the appropriate consideration for the sale of organs, then the
143. Note that these principles do not constitute an exhaustive list. They are merely general principles
necessary to facilitate an increased supply of organs through a limited market
144. Williams, supra note 14, at 348.
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money should be paid upon the removal of the organ, and not
during the life of the donor.45
Following the contracting individual's death, the contract would be
implemented by removing the organs from the cadaver; the organ data would
then be entered into a central registry computer network, facilitating matches
between donors and donees.'" The organ procurement agency would then be
responsible for distributing the organs to those in need. Organ distribution
would be determined as a result of altruistic criteria, not financial incentives.
This would prevent the wealthy from outbidding others to obtain organs from
the middleman agency.
These agencies would be private firms licensed by the government of each
country in question to operate as organ "warehouses"; centers of buying and
distribution. These firms would need to operate on a global level to minimize
rights violations and bartering in countries with different systems. 47 In the
absence of a universally accepted organ procurement system the black market
will continue in any country which chooses to operate a separate system. 4" The
requirement for private agencies arises from the need to operate on a global
level. If the middleman entity were a government agency, it would not be able
to operate within the territorial boundaries of other nations. If a national of one
state were injured in another, the home state would need a principle by which
it could exercise jurisdiction.49
Under any middleman system, a computer network would have to be
centralized to match patient with organ before deterioration of the organ begins;
it would also have to monitor the deaths of people with whom it had
contracted.5 °
C. Categories of Systems
The march of medical advances for organ transplantation is being impeded
by feeble policy and deficient systems. The potential for eliminating the organ
deficit may well depend more on progress in the legal aspects of organ donation
145. Altman, supra note 5, at 179.
146. Id. at 180.
147. Williams, supra note 14, at 321.
148. Altman, supra note 5, at 181.
149. Williams, supra note 14, at 352.
150. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 38.
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than on advances in medical technology.'' Any system of organ procurement
must adequately fulfill the two goals set out previously: (1) maximizing organ
procurement to a degree which eliminates the shortage of organs for transplant,
and (2) avoiding unnecessary encroachments on individual autonomy as well as
human rights violations. Only by achieving these two goals simultaneously, and
not sacrificing one or the other, will the organ supply be increased in a manner
that is both efficient and fair.
In essence, systems attempting to achieve these two goals create one of four
results: they may satisfy both goals, neither goal, or one or the other of the
goals. The only acceptable system is one that satisfies both goals. None of the
existing systems achieve both goals; they all fall into one of the other three
categories. Presumed consent systems neither cure the shortage nor protect
autonomy; altruistic systems protect autonomy but fail to increase the organ
supply; and regardless of whether or not they cure the organ deficit,
conscription systems are not satisfactory due to their record of human rights
abuses.
1. Presumed Consent Systems
The presumed consent system embraced by nations of the European Union
achieves neither of the goals; the system does not eliminate the shortage of
organs for transplant and, at the same time, it encroaches on the ideal of
personal autonomy.
The first goal involves the determination of a factual question: is the
number of organs collected sufficient to cover the number of organs needed?
Under this system, the shortage has not been reduced. Statistics continue to
show that more organs are needed than are donated."2 The ethical question of
whether personal freedoms are being devalued requires a bit more extensive
analysis since it does not turn on a numbers calculus.
Upon examination, it is apparent that the system of presumed consent
encroaches on individual freedoms. Under presumed consent, silence equals
consent to removing organs; in the event of an objection, organs might be
removed anyway. This occurs in France and Belgium if a reasonable effort
151. S. S. Fluss, Trade in Human Organs: National and International Responses, in ORGAN AND
TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION INTHE EUROPEAN UNION,supra note 6, at 74 (citing W.N. Gerson, Refining the Law
of Organ Donation: Lessons from the French Law of Presumed Consent, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1013,
1013-1032).
152. Clark, supra note 8, at 930-31; Anderson, supra note 8, at 253.
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search cannot turn up an objection; in Austria, even a reasonable effort search
is not required prior to the removal of organs.' These nations have placed a
low premium on the freedom of choice. In a sense they have arguably legalized
a conscription of organs by espousing a public policy that presumes consent to
organ harvest unless a donor makes a valid declaration otherwise.
Proponents of presumed consent might argue that the devaluation of
individual autonomy is slight and is negated by the increased harvest of organs.
Two responses are in order. First, the somewhat higher rates of organ donation
under presumed consent systems versus altruistic systems are of little
consequence; neither system is curing the problem ofthe shortage. Second, this
position assumes that individual autonomy may be compromised somewhat to
serve a "higher good." An ideal such as freedom should not be treated as if it
does not matter greatly if occassionally suppressed. Individual freedoms are
extremely important; it is necessary to guard against any step, even if slight,
that may lead to a slippery slope of other suppressions in order to procure
organs. One commentator presented just this argument:
In the present context, the problem is not the motive of those
who would assert rights or claims to our bodies. The highest
motive will, typically be demonstrated-preservation of life
and health and the cure of the sick. The need is to recognize
danger when it is not intended, and to bring to bear a clear eye
and an inquiring mind on proposals which directly affect our
persons and liberties. Any new law that confers power over
the human body, whether made by a legislature or by a court,
has such an aspect and should give us pause."
This demonstrates the importance of protecting against encroachments, not
because of any dangers presented by one with proper motives, but to guard
against one who in the future may desire to use a system already in place for
purposes not so pure.
153. See Kurnit, supra note 8, at 422-23.
154. ScOTT, supra note 1, at 99.
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2. Systems Based on Altruistic Principles
Altruistic systems like the one in the United States achieve only one of the
two goals: they preserve personal autonomy but fail to solve the organ supply
problem. A system of altruism leaves the donation decision to the individual,
but the effectiveness of producing maximum organ procurement is poor. " The
organ shortage in the United States has been of such duration that organ
transplant laws have been modified to increase voluntary donation."6 However,
these modifications have not cured the shortage and will not in the future. The
problem is not the operation of the altruistic system; the problem inheres in the
system itself. This system does not create proper incentives for increasing
organ donation. Consequently, as altruism has failed to ameliorate the organ
deficit in the past, we should not continue to rely on it to do so.'
3. Conscriptive Systems
A conscriptive system may solve the shortage, but at the expense of
violating human rights. China is an example of such a system. Due to the
secret nature of organ harvesting, it is impossible to know how far-reaching this
program is or just how many organs it can supply.'58 Not only is conscription
likely to yield a large number of organs, it is theoretically possible the system
may yield a surplus.'59 Under the conscription system a market for murder may
be created akin to the "body-snatching" market in the early 1800s. The
principal difference lies in the identities of the actors. In the body-snatching
scandals, individuals were responsible; in the conscriptive system, the actor is
the state. Due to the extensive human rights violations that result, conscriptive
155. Williams, supra note 14, at 336.
156. Id. It has been recently proposed that the laws be modified again. Secretary of Health and Human
Services Donna Shalala has proposed consolidating all those in need of an organ transplant into a single national
recipient list under uniform criteria; she also proposes that this national list should "allocate organs among
transplant candidates in order of decreasing medical urgency status," so those in more dire medical situations
will receive the first transplants. See Richard A. Epstein, Sell Your Body, Save a Life, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16,
1998, at A22. As Mr. Epstein points out, the risk in this policy lies in the fact that the sickest patients, are the
ones with the lowest survival rates and any such shift in policy to place them at the front of the line could lead
to a waste of organ resources; rather, he proposes increasing the supply of organs through the use of a market
system. Id.
157. EPSTEtN, supra note 138, at 1.
158. However, some data indicates that the number of kidneys and comeas procured is between 2,000
and 3,000. Owen, supra note 126, at 496.
159. A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organsfor Transplantation: Exploring the
Alternatives, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 117, 130 (1993).
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systems must be strictly forbidden. The purpose of obtaining organs should be
to save human lives. This purpose is not met when one human is murdered to
let another live. Thus, conscriptive systems represent an arbitrary
determination that the life of one person is worth more than another.
4. The Middleman System
The fourth and final category is comprised of middleman systems. Under
middleman systems an increased supply of organs cures the shortage and people
retain a maximum amount of individual freedom. As we have seen, the systems
implemented today fall into the other three categories. The proposed middleman
system is the only one that satisfies the twin goals of organ procurement
systems. This system harnesses the financial incentives of a limited commercial
market to increase supply. This requires an examination of the benefits of the
open market.
D. Market Systems
The benefit of market systems lies in their ability to produce a sufficient
supply of a commodity that is in demand. A free-market system uses the
financial incentive of payment to encourage a sufficient number of individuals
to sell their body parts."w In the market, the supply would be self-regulating
because rising demand would raise the price of tissues in short supply and
produce incentives for individuals to sell their organs; these prices would ensure
that enough organs would be available to meet demand.' A major problem
with current organ procurement systems is their anathema to price incentives
which could be used to increase organ supply. As one commentator notes: "[A]
shortage in organs, like tomatoes or rental housing, is simply evidence of a
malfunctioning market. No surprises here, just the usual unfortunate
consequences--queues and intrigue-when markets are banned.'
' 62
The use of a market system in human organs would operate on the same
principles as many other markets. As such, it would increase the amount of
organs available for transplant. This approach also places a very high premium
on individual rights.
160. ScoTw, supra note 1, at 182.
161. Id.
162. EPSmN, supra note 138, at 8.
652 [Vol. 5:621
THE BODY AS COMMODITY
1. Advantages of the Market System
The biggest advantage ofthe free market is its ability to increase the supply
of organs available for transplantation. As one commentator noted:
Don't ask whether youwould sell your organs. You may be no
more likely to do that than to commit murder. But just as
criminal sanctions influence those closest to the edge, so too
our organ markets will respond to those most likely to donate
for a price. 6'
This free market system enjoys its greatest popularity in the United States.
Americans accept the market as an alternative to altruistic systems and the
coercive power of the state."
In practice, offering payment for organs will increase supply. Not only will
some form of payment entice people to override their discomfort at the idea of
organ donation but it will also transform the donor card into a legally binding
contract, resulting in an increased physician sense of comfort with following the
wishes of the deceased rather than seeking the family's permission.'65 Markets
are efficient mechanisms for transferring and allocating any good or resource;
here, that good happens to be human organs." This method of obtaining
organs not only works on a theoretical level, but has worked demonstrably in
practice as well. Today, nations which permit the sale of organs also procure
the greatest number of organs.'67
The market system would ameliorate many of the problems inherent in
current systems implemented in various nations. One advantage of the market
system is that everyone in the equation benefits from the trade. This is different
from systems of altruism where all the gains go in one direction, to the organ
recipient, and all the losses go in the other, to the organ donor.'68 Proponents
of the market system argue that compensation paid from the gainer to the loser
is the best way to rectify the imbalance between the loss, borne privately by the
163. Id. at 10.
164. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 182.
165. Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1623-24.
166. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 28.
167. Williams, supra note 14, at 322.
168. EPSTN, supra note 138, at 9-10.
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donor, and gain, which belongs to society. 69 In a system where the net social
gain reaches the transferor, the supply of organs should increase due to the
increased gain achieved by selling as distinguished from donating. 7
2. Disadvantages of a Market System
Most opponents of the market system do not deny the market would
increase supply. Rather, they argue that a market in bodily organs is unethical
and will result in human rights violations. These arguments are philosophical
rather than economic. The main reason given for opposing a free market in
bodily organs is its alleged exploitation of the poor. One commentator notes:
"Unfortunately, no well-regulated commercial market for human organs
currently exists; those countries where organ sales are legal are among the worst
violators of human rights and the exploitation of the poor."'' However, as this
argument itself notes, the catalyst for these abuses is the lack of well-regulated
markets. The market involved in the "middleman" proposal would be subject
to strict regulations to avoid encroachments on human rights.
A second argument asserts that there are some commodities, e.g., organs,
that should not be part of a market system.
[W]hen life and death issues are involved, we no longer rely
solely on the market. Food stamps are given to those who
cannot afford to buy their own food, emergency shelter given
to the homeless when the temperature becomes dangerously
cold, emergency medical care provided to the poor when they
have no insurance."
It is true that financial incentives are used to induce individuals to sell to organ
procurement agencies. It is equally true that rising prices will ensure that
enough supply will be generated to cover demand. However, once the
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Williams, supra note 14, at 345.
172. Anderson, supra note 8, at 295.
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middleman possesses the organs altruistic criteria are used to determine who
gets an organ-not just who can afford it.""
Opponents also assert that commercial systems may reduce altruism in
society. A sense of altruism can be a powerful force whereby the exchange of
organs results not only in the saving of a life but in the binding together of
society; allowing sales transactions for human organs may diminish people's
respect for themselves."" Although the middleman admittedly exchanges
monetary consideration for organs, altruistic criteria are used in distributing the
organs from the procurement agencies (as long as there is a shortage). Perhaps
this is an acceptable ramification for a system that eliminates the organ shortage
and allows for personal autonomy, all while not completely devoid of altruism.
Additionally, the tenets laid out for the operation of the middleman system
specifically exempt live altruistic donations, like kidneys. Additionally, under
any exchange the system does not require a person to sell organs if he or she
wishes to donate them; it merely permits sales if desired.
Opponents of commercialization point out that transplant technologies have
been developed and are supported with public funds and, therefore, financial
success should not be a basis for receiving a transplant. "5 Once again, this
argument is negated by the altruistic criteria used by the middleman system as
long as there is an organ shortage. These arguments would be more effective
if individuals on the street were permitted to bargain with one another for
organs. However, in the regulated system proposed here, this would not be
permitted. The market's advantages outweigh its disadvantages.
The market harbors a tremendous ability to increase the supply of organs
by offering financial incentives to the individual. Since the individual is only
allowed to sell to the middleman, and since recipients are only allowed to
receive organs from the middleman based on altruistic criteria, the system
artfully uses the incentives of the market to procure organs while eliminating
arbitrary criteria in organ distribution. This system satisfies both goals of an
organ procurement system (eliminate organ shortage and avoid rights
encroachments). Moreover, this result can be accomplished in an efficient and
173. Ofcourse, as previously mentioned, the middleman system envisages a future where no criteria will
be needed to dole out organs. By increasing the organ supply through the financial incentives of the limited
market eventually a point will be reached when supply equals demand. At that point, there will be no need to
use criteria, altruistic or otherwise, in the distribution of organs.
174. Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 46, at 36.
175. George J. Annas, The Prostitute, the Playboy, and the Poet: Rationing Schemes for Organ
Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 29, at 332.
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fair manner. Finally, a limited commercial system could be successfully
implemented today. Markets in the United States for the sale of blood provide
strong empirical evidence that a commercialization approach for organ
transplanis would work well.
E. The Blood Market Analogy
The buying and selling ofblood is commonplace in society today. This was
not always so. Once, ethical debate raged around whether the sale of blood
should be allowed. Today, "[t]he tissue most widely bought and sold in the
United States is blood. Payment is also made as a routine matter for urine, skin,
and other body fluids such as sweat, saliva, and semen."'76 In addition, bodily
parts such as hair and teeth have been objects of the open market for centuries
in Europe.' The idea of blood for sale has been readily accepted by society.
Today, there are more than 400 blood banks in the United States and that
country's two billion dollar industry in exporting blood leads the world.'78
Blood, however, is slightly different in that it is treated as a service and not
a product. 79 The purpose of this legal fiction is to avoid the imposition of strict
liability or implied warranties of fitness of sellers of blood. ° No arguments
are advanced against the safety, efficacy, or desirability of placing blood on a
market system.
The safety of the blood market is an important point when examining
markets for nonregenerative organs. Many of the same unfounded criticisms of
a market in organs parallel those made in opposition to a market in blood. One
typical criticism is that purchased organs will exhibit a higher frequency of
disease than donated organs; the same criticism was levied against sold blood.'
This criticism turned out to be fatuous.
A number of studies published in the late 1960's indicated that,
compared to donated blood, patients who received blood from
commercial sources exhibited a higher frequency of
post-transfusion hepatitis. Yet a reevaluation of the data
176. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 190.
177. Id. at 180.
178. Wagner, supra note 35, at 945.
179. Gerike, supra note 33, at 814.
180. Id.
181. Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1624.
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reveals that there was no necessary correlation between
payment and the rate of post-transfusion hepatitis.'
The defective blood was traced to blood centers located in areas where the
population had a higher incidence of hepatitis and to inadequate screening
technology.' "These limitations do not apply to screening potential organ
donors because screening for inferior or infected tissue is relatively quick and
inexpensive when the 'cadaver lies exposed in the hospital treatment room."""'U
The experiences with blood demonstrate that many of the charges levied
against an open market in bodily organs are baseless. Markets in organs can
provide a supply of sorely needed organs in a safe and effective manner, much
like the commercial market provides for blood needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the advent of organ transplantation in the 1950s and 1960s and the
subsequent improvements in techniques and antirejection drugs, today's rates of
success can truly be termed a medical miracle. 8 The success of organ
transplantation can be viewed in the hard and fast terms of numbers of lives
saved, as well as in the abstract terms of improvements in the quality of life
enjoyed by organ recipients. If possible, these benefits should be made
available to everyone; absent panacea, the medical community should strive to
attain as closely as possible this mark. Medicine will need systems developed
by the law to aid in its quest to achieve a sufficient supply of organs.
Unfortunately, rates of organ procurement remain substantially lower than
the number of organs needed. Even more unfortunate is the fact that enough
deaths occur every year to provide enough organs to satisfy the transplant
demand. The very fact that organ procurement systems in place today do not
adequately create incentives for people to donate their organs is evidence that
the systems themselves are inadequate.
A new system is needed, one that commercializes organs in a global
network. By allowing people to contract for the exchange of organs for
monetary consideration, the market opens up financial incentives that increase
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1625.
184. Id.
185. See Kumit, supra note 8, at 407; Silver, supra note 12, at 682.
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the available supply of organs. At the same time, the use of a "middleman"
agency will prevent individual bartering for organs and ensure that altruistic
criteria are used to distribute the organ supply during an organ shortage. Only
by taking this first step of commercialization can it be hoped that inroads may
be made into decreasing, and eventually eliminating, the organ deficit.
